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Fink: The Trouble with Mixed Motives

THE TROUBLE WITH MIXED MOTIVES
Debating the Political, Legal, and Moral Dimensions of Intervention
Commander Susan D. Fink, U.S. Navy

I

n the aftermath of the Iraq war and transfer to Iraqi authority, a bitter debate
persists over the motives for the war and the reasons for the transatlantic antipathy it engendered. There are those who argue that moral talk coming out of the
White House represents a fig leaf for realpolitik, a change in tactics after the failure to find evidence of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. Why
had President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, both known for
their moral personal philosophies and foreign policies, relied primarily on legal
1
and threat-based justifications? Why did they leave until the eleventh hour the
moral argument about Saddam’s brutish behavior toward the Iraqi people?
Does the timing of various justifications belie their validity?
The Iraq war, like the 1999 Kosovo campaign, was launched without a United
Nations Security Council resolution explicitly authorizing it. Some say this unhinged the international legal order, that all moral talk must be expunged from intervention discourse to pave the way for a new legal
Commander Fink is a member of the Naval War Col2
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anti-American and anti-Western sentiment take advantage of the dispute. The
national motivations, indeed, were fundamentally mixed, and skeptics and supporters alike see that as a problem. Yet motives in international politics are invariably mixed. Why then the rancor?
The reason is that there has been a shift in the normative landscape, a radicalization of moral, legal, and political arguments for and against war. What happened in the Iraq case cannot be fully explained by any one of these dimensions
3
alone. It is better to look at the way states authorize and justify the use of force,
satisfying domestic and international political requirements—how in this instance Washington, London, Paris, and Bonn chose to justify their behavior
leading up to the Iraq war—using all three dimensions, and then test the accusations against them. By examining three contending imperatives within each
state’s thinking about intervention—imperatives of power, cooperation, and
human solidarity—it is possible to understand the decision each government
made.
Again, the truth about motives is not to be found in any one of these ways of
thinking—moral, legal, or political—but rather in the debate among them. This
approach denies us the ability to make satisfying judgments against one side or
the other in the Iraq debate. Yet a complete picture of what happened is not possible without it.
POWER, COOPERATION, AND MORAL SOLIDARITY
The “triptych” approach to understanding international behavior, and the same
set of three categories, by whatever names, have proven advantageous in the
past. Lecturing at the London School of Economics in the 1950s, Martin Wight
identified three traditions of international thought evident since the Renaissance: the Realists, Rationalists, and Revolutionists.4 Others have also found that
tracing the debate among the three traditions is essential to understanding the
most important questions of international politics. Hedley Bull called their respective advocates Hobbesians, Grotians, and Kantians, and more recently Stewart
Patrick analyzed the way unilateral and multilateral means are used to achieve
5
nationalist, internationalist and collective objectives. Hereafter, we will call the
three traditions the “power,” “cooperative,” and “solidarity” approaches.
The power tradition sees the world as a system of states organized only by the
relative power they can wield. Force is the dominant mode of international interaction, since no authority higher than the state exists to enforce national will,
laws, or norms. Its adherents take a positivist approach to international law, emphasizing what is rather than what ought to be. The power approach has both aggressive and defensive forms. On the aggressive side, it is willing to impose
interests, or in some cases norms, through the use of force. Its more defensive
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variant favors the promotion of interest by noncoercive means, such as
multilateralism and international law.
The cooperative tradition, in contrast, sees an international society—more
than a system but not quite a state—underpinned by law and institutions, its
parts increasingly interdependent. From this perspective, international politics
are shaped less by international anarchy than by custom arising from habitual
interaction. Cooperation rather than conflict is the dominant mode of international relations in this tradition. This approach recognizes the existence of international anarchy, on the one hand, but appreciates the value of universal norms
on the other. It seeks to reconcile the two by finding the “lesser evil” in policy debates; it concerns itself with matters of law and justice, employs the just war doctrine, looks for the “law behind the law,” and seeks multilateral approaches to
diplomacy. There are realist and idealist variants of the cooperative approach; the
realist aspect tends to employ multilateral approaches for coercive purposes, while
its idealist counterpart sees multilateralism as a way of fostering shared norms.
The third tradition sees the world as one of moral solidarity—an international community that should eventually become a state under a central authority. This view sees the world as made up not so much of states or institutions as
of individuals and ideas in which domestic and international politics merge.
The moral solidarity view is only superficially about relations among states; it
focuses more on collective goals, such as human rights, the environment, labor
relations, and other matters it considers of importance to humankind. Inherent
in solidarism is mutual exclusivity of ideals, and adherents may promote their
ideal using evolutionary or revolutionary means. The evolutionary form focuses
on promoting universal ideals through noncoercive measures, while revolutionary adherents are willing to enforce their ideas, even by violent means.
Power-based thinking is attractive to states, which seek to protect and advance their own interests and security. Humanitarian intervention has challenged but has in turn been informed by this approach, producing such hybrids
as the “right to intervene” and the Bush administration’s doctrine of limited pre6
emption. Calculations of national interest remain central to the French and
German demand for multilateralism, just as they do to the American and British
war on terror. The persistence of the power approach is also partly explained by
the longevity of the “unipolar moment,” which brings about attempts to counterweight the power of the United States as the sole remaining superpower.
The cooperative approach, nonetheless, has become increasingly embedded
in international politics since World War II. The number of international institutions has proliferated in recent years, growing by two-thirds from 1985 to
1999. Such regimes aspire to rein in national power and to harness the best of the
moral solidarity imperative by codifying its norms in law. The extensive resort
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to just war doctrine and the continued importance of seeking UN mandates,
such as in the Kosovo and Iraq episodes, are evidence of the persuasiveness of the
cooperative tradition.
An upswing of the solidarist thinking is evident in examining the Kosovo and
Iraq crises; the national decisions made in those cases cannot be explained
purely in terms of power calculations or the requirements of international law.
In the months before the Iraq campaign, the human solidarity imperative remained even for states that did not focus on the humanitarian aspects of the
problem. States sought international legitimacy by casting in moral terms the
struggles between freedom and liberation and between multilateralism and
unilateralism.
Thus the rise of solidarist thinking, the institutionalization of cooperative
thought, and the persistence of power-based decision making will make the use
of force even more hotly debated in the future. In the Kosovo instance, decision
makers satisfied the demands of all three imperatives; where they do not, consensus will be unlikely.
WHAT HAPPENED IN KOSOVO
In March 1999, NATO launched an aerial campaign over Serbia. Extensive diplomacy, including three Security Council resolutions and negotiations convened
under threat of coercion, had failed to resolve the crisis caused by “ethnic cleans7
ing” perpetrated against ethnic Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo. By
consulting all three traditions, each nation found a combination of political, legal, and moral grounds that overcame resistance to the decision to intervene.
Germany and France initially demanded a UNSC mandate, insisting that
without it the action would be illegal under international law. They later reversed their positions, for different reasons. Germany was reacting to a tension
within the cooperativist tradition that pitted its post–World War II commitment to international law and multilateralism against its strong wish to be a re8
sponsible, reliable international partner. The German position also revealed a
tension within solidarism: its left-leaning coalition government was torn between a tradition of pacifism and a desire to uphold human rights and humanitarianism. In the end, the commitments to reliable international partnership
and to humanitarian values overcame pacifism and insistence upon
9
multilateralism. The result was a watershed event: the German troops sent to
Kosovo were the first ordered to participate in offensive military operations in
10
fifty years—and the decision had been made without a UNSC mandate. The
German case, then, was essentially a tension between elements of the cooperative and solidarist traditions, in which the moral component tipped the scales
toward intervention.
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France’s stance on authorization reflected a desire to bolster its position as a
veto-bearing member of the Security Council; it rested authority solely on the
11
authority of previous council resolutions. Yet it had to claim this legitimacy
without the resolution that it had previously insisted upon throughout the cri12
sis. This insistence reflected long-standing reservations about American dominance of NATO and European security affairs, and France’s aspiration to a
13
leadership role on the continent. Throughout the crisis, French officials ex14
pressed concern about “a new American unilateralism.” To reverse his stance
on the UN mandate, President Jacques Chirac declared that “the humanitarian
situation constitutes a ground that can justify an exception to a rule, however
15
strong and firm it is.”
France framed its arguments in just war terms—in particular, the fulfillment
of the principle of last resort and NATO’s just cause in the face of Milosevic’s
barbarous crimes and continued recalcitrance. The French justification was also
a moral one, not just because of humanitarian aims but in its sense of spreading
French values as universal norms, especially the “matter of human rights on our
16
continent.” The French approach was thus essentially a hybrid of power and
solidarist thinking, with multilateralism supporting both.
The British, for their part, claimed the existence of an “humanitarian exception” to the authority of the Security Council and cited previous resolutions as a
17
legal basis. The British justification represented a blend of strong cooperativist
and solidarist traditions. Prime Minister Tony Blair explained, “This is a just
war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values. We cannot let the evil
of ethnic cleansing stand. . . . We have learned twice before in this century that
appeasement does not work. If we let an evil dictator range unchallenged, we
18
will have to spill infinitely more blood and treasure to stop him later.” Blair further framed the crisis as a fight between the forces of order and “a disintegration
into chaos and disorder” in which “many regimes . . . are undemocratic and en19
gaged in barbarous acts.” Whereas the Germans saw tension between values
and interests, Britons accepted what Blair called a “subtle blend of mutual self
20
interest and moral purpose” in which “the spread of our values makes us safer.”
The British approach was thus a harmony of cooperativist and solidarist
thinking.
The United States based its legal justification on previous Security Council
resolutions, the impending humanitarian emergency, and a threat to peace and
security in the region. In the debates within the U.S. government, justification
was framed in terms of the national interest. By the end of the 1990s, the administration believed it had exhausted congressional patience with requests for
troops where vital national interests were not at stake. In any case, interest-based
arguments resonated with the American people as well, as did emphasis on U.S.
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rather than UN authorization to act. The American case was thus essentially
power based, with moral claims and legal aspects adduced in support.
The three traditions, then, were clearly present in the decision making of each
of the four countries in 1999. All three dimensions had to be accommodated to
make consensus possible. The lesson of the Kosovo case is that diverging attitudes can be reconciled if decision makers satisfy the demands of all three imperatives. It also points to an upswing in the power of the solidarist arguments,
which forcefully challenged both strictly power-based calculations of national
interest and cooperativist attachment to international law.
WHAT HAPPENED IN IRAQ
The Iraq case shows that the ethical dimension was influenced by two contending agendas for the future of international order. Even though the Americans
and British, on one side, and the French and Germans, on the other, differed on
justification and authorization, both viewed Iraq, as they had Kosovo, in the
context of a struggle between “civilization” and “barbarity.” Their visions of civilization, however, were sharply at variance. The American and British leaders
saw a struggle between human liberty and oppression, between democracy and
dictatorship; the French and Germans saw a contest between multilateralism and
21
unilateralism, between collective responsibility and superpower prerogative.
Ethical determinations regarding authorization and justification were
shaped by these contending viewpoints, just as these lenses continue today to
color judgments on the decisions of early 2003. One such judgment is that important moral dimensions were not taken account of at the time; in particular,
there was insufficient frank discussion of the humanitarian costs of the alternatives of war and of continued coercive diplomacy and containment.
The November 2002 vote on Security Council Resolution 1441 was viewed as a
referendum on war with Iraq. France insisted that its vote in favor of the resolution
22
was meant to “strengthen the role of the UN”; this insistence reflected France’s interest in strengthening its own international position as a permanent member of the
Security Council. The United States and Britain saw UNSCR 1441 as fulfilling the
last-resort principle; France and Germany disagreed, countering that “the condi23
tions for using force against Iraq are not fulfilled.” The Germans insisted that “the
unity of the [UN Security] Council is of central importance” and, in light of that
24
imperative, argued for a continuation of containment, sanctions, and no-fly zones.
Nonproliferation regimes had not, Berlin felt, been fully exploited; the Germans
held that “peaceful means have therefore not been exhausted,” that the Security
25
Council was “crucial to world order” in the future, and that war should be avoided.
The German approach was thus cooperativist, but because it allowed no military
option at all, it was also solidarist, taking the form of an idealized multilateralism.
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President Chirac took a moral-exclusivist stance as well, on the necessary
source of authority for war. He maintained that the UN was “the only legitimate
framework for building peace, in Iraq and elsewhere” and that France would ad26
vance its principles through collective action. Other French officials, meanwhile, were arguing that adherence to international law was a moral obligation,
that only such law could legitimate the use of force, and that France must ad27
vance the idea of collective responsibility. At home, Jacques Chirac’s popular28
ity soared in proportion to the anti-American nature of his stance. Just as in
the Kosovo case, France’s position was thus a moralized power-based approach,
with the cooperative tradition in a supporting role.
The British, as they had in Kosovo, insisted upon a sound legal basis for intervention in Iraq. The British attorney general declared that military action would
29
not violate international law, though other lawyers insisted on the opposite.
The British people insisted on either proof of the existence of weapons of mass
30
destruction or issuance of a UN mandate. Politicians called for a separate Security Council mandate for the reconstruction of Iraq, in order to avoid a postwar
occupation situation; the prime minister accordingly persuaded the Americans
to seek a second Security Council resolution for intervention. Yet the British
stance was as moral as it was legal. Echoing his approach in 1999, Blair couched
the threat as “disorder and chaos” that jeopardized other foreign policy aims
such as the alleviation of poverty, protection of the environment, and the promotion of international health. The threat, he held, was embodied in states and
31
groups that “hate our way of life, our freedom, our democracy.” As in the
Kosovo case, the struggle was not with the people of the Iraqi nation but with
32
“barbarous rulers” who defied collective norms and laws. Thus the British argument, like the German position, was a combination of strong cooperative and
solidarity approaches.
The United States relied on previous Security Council resolutions to authorize intervention—a cooperativist approach. This tradition was also apparent in
American just war arguments. Washington interpreted UNSCR 1441 and subsequent inspections as giving Saddam his last chance, beyond which lay force, the
last resort. Secretary Powell later recalled, “We gave diplomacy every chance. . . .
33
[W]e could wait no longer.” The power approach was also clearly evident in the
American case: “The United States of America has the sovereign authority to use
34
force in assuring its own national security.”
Thus cooperative and power-based imperatives informed the way the United
States viewed authorization for war. However, the roles of both had their limits.
While legal advisers suggested that the American presence in Iraq was technically an occupation, the moral imperative of “liberation” was more important.
The president made Iraqi liberation the centerpiece of his 2003 Captive Nations
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35

Week address. Stating his case at the UN General Assembly before the war, the
president emphasized solidarity with the Iraqi people, who had, he said, “suffered too long in silent captivity.” He explained, “Liberty for the Iraqi people is a
36
great moral cause, and a great strategic goal.” Finally, the whole approach was
couched as a great struggle for human liberty. The idea of liberation is central to
solidarist thinking.
In his well known June 2002 West Point graduation speech, the president
37
spoke of the American “commanders who [had] saved a civilization.” In his
speech at the war’s end, he likened the American posture to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
Four Freedoms, the Truman Doctrine, and Ronald Reagan’s “evil empire” doc38
trine. Clearly, Bush saw the state of the world as a struggle between the civilized
forces of democracy and human liberty, on one side, and the barbaric forces of
39
oppression on the other. The American position, like that of the French, was
thus a strongly solidarist version of the power-based approach. Like the German
and British, they had similar approaches but reached opposite conclusions on
intervention. Likewise the German and French reached the same conclusion
from different motives.
Decision makers did not reach agreement, as they had four years earlier, and
policy and diplomacy have suffered thereby. In particular, the Iraqi people and
the men and women of the coalition forces have lost the benefits that could have
accrued from increased international cooperation. But it is not too late.
A WAY AHEAD
The Kosovo crisis was a turning point for international politics, but was it a
death knell for the international legal order? Can states take steps to heal the
breach? The lesson of the collective Kosovo decision of the NATO nations was
that if the demands of three contending imperatives—the fundamental, underlying “mixed motives”—are met, diplomacy benefits and consensus emerges. In
2003, in contrast, decision makers on both sides of the intervention debate
showed disappointing unwillingness to recognize the lessons of the Kosovo
campaign, and in this sense Iraq was an opportunity lost. If the structural deficiencies that exacerbate discord are addressed, however, cohesive policy is possible. Even before then, there are some practical steps that states can take.
Accept the Dilemma of Mixed Motives. Policy makers can resist temptations to
exploit seeming inconsistencies in policy to their political advantage. They can
instead ratchet down the rhetoric and accept, as Michael Walzer urges us, that
“the lives of foreigners don’t weigh that heavily in the scales of domestic decision
40
making. So we shall have to consider the moral significance of mixed motives.”
In both the Kosovo and Iraq cases, there existed neither strictly realpolitik nor
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purely cooperative positions. Leaders can help publics recognize the dilemma of
diverging moral imperatives, just as they acknowledge contending interests and
varying, even conflicting, legal interpretations.
Make the Humanitarian and Human Rights Case. One of the casualties of the trend
toward polarization between the war on terror and the multilateral imperative
was the thorough discussion of humanitarian considerations. Justifications offered
before the Iraq intervention, and criticism of those justifications, did not bear out
the promise of what some human rights advocates had seen after the Kosovo in41
tervention as “the beginning of the new age of human rights enforcement.”
The United States and Britain produced reports regarding Saddam Hussein’s
abuses but did not refer to them extensively. Human rights and humanitarian
42
officials were surprisingly absent from the debates. The French/German side
argued for disarmament rather than regime change, whereas the American/
British coalition called for the use of force. The human rights/humanitarian argument for the removal of Saddam Hussein but against the use of force was not
fully heard, and this was a missed opportunity. First, the suffering of the Iraqi
people, concealed for years by limited access, could have been more fully exposed. Second, such arguments would have resonated with publics and citizens,
who deserved but did not see an open and careful weighing of the human costs
43
and benefits of either containment or military intervention. Finally, such an
argument, forcefully made, would have increased pressure on regional regimes
to censure Saddam Hussein.
Establish Criteria for Just War Decision Making. Just war criteria reemerged in
the 1990s as a framework for moral arguments about the use of force. In 2003, it
at least made the language of proper authority, just cause, and right intention
central in public pronouncements. In part, the ethic was popular with governments because it gave them general and persuasive norms to which to appeal,
rather than specific and possibly binding laws. That such words resonate with
publics, however, is no doubt the main reason leaders use them. Decision makers
should establish criteria applying just war principles to various situations such
as rogue states possessing WMD, reducing the temptation to wield just war doctrine solely as a political tool and thus enhancing its usefulness in general.
UNIVERSAL VALUES: MORAL TALK IS STATE PRACTICE
The moral dimension played an important role in the political and legal debates
about authorization and justification of intervention in Kosovo and Iraq. The
moral element was not merely “tacked on” or secondary; rather, it informed legal and political considerations, overcoming objections to the use of force in
Kosovo and causing a standoff among NATO allies with regard to Iraq.
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The lesson is that of the three imperatives that influence international behavior, the solidarist approach will be increasingly important in the decades ahead
but that laws and institutions have not caught up to the social reality. This is
nothing new. In the nineteenth century, the dominance of the power tradition
stimulated bilateral international relations and brought an institutionalized balance of power. In the twentieth century, the cooperative approach prevailed in
the aftermath of two world wars, and multilateralism and international institutions proliferated. Entering the twenty-first century, the solidarist imperative is
on the rise, fostered by transnational movements, the democratization of information technology, and other trends.44 Current political and legal structures are
inadequate to address this increasingly collective consciousness, on one hand,
and increasing transborder threats, state failure, and poverty on the other. The
legitimacy of unilateralism and multilateralism is no longer the issue; the need is
for a three-tiered diplomacy that integrates—by addressing simultaneously—
the persistence of power, the embedded nature of cooperation, and the
45
reemergence of the solidarist imperative.
A way to begin is to identify and bolster the elements of the old order that nations hold most dearly and in common. Norms of humanitarian intervention,
protection, and prevention of WMD proliferation have all been proposed as ripe
46
for codification, but states continue to resist engaging the matter. A decade after the Rwanda genocide, decision makers have yet to develop criteria for responding to such crises. In his address to the UN on 23 September 2003, Kofi
Annan lamented that the international community was “hesitant and tardy” in
engaging in “serious discussions of the best way to respond to threats of geno47
cide or other comparable massive violations of human rights.” With that task
still undone, leaders must now agree upon criteria for countering imminent
threats of rogue states and terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction.
Codification and criteria development will be a difficult process, but one well
48
worth the diplomatic toil.
That said, nations should give existing universal values a chance. Western intellectuals are often the quickest to question the universality of norms, such as
those in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They can do so only by ignoring the fact that the declaration had international authorship and offers in49
ternational benefits. Likewise, critics may continue to argue that the trend
away from United Nations mandates means that all talk of right and wrong
should be expunged from the law and replaced by state practice. The Kosovo and
Iraq decisions, however, show that moral talk is state practice. The reason is that,
despite significant legal and political disagreements surrounding authorization
and justification for forcible intervention, fundamental freedoms, to those who
do not yet possess them, remain more than rhetorical.
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